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I. International Trade Principle 
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Export control is an exception to 
international free trade principle  established 
by the WTO    
  Organised by GATT, GATTS 
 
Derogations to this principle are exceptional 
and strictly defined 
 - Founded on economic reasons : a step 
  toward the achievement of the free 
  movements 
-  Founded on non-economic reasons : 
national security interest 
4 
National security interest ? 
Not defined by the GATT : left to the 
understanding of each State Party 
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed  
(b)      to prevent any contracting party from 
taking any action which it considers 
necessary for the protection of its essential 
security interests  
(i)      relating to fissionable materials or 
the materials from which they are 
derived;  
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Two potential interpretations of the 
“security interest” 
 
- Minimum : only to face non-proliferation 
State’s commitments 
 NPT, NSG 
- Maximum : could be used for all nuclear 
trade derogations 
 Nuclear trade could be limited to 
 assurance/protection of national energy 
 needs 
II. International Nuclear Trade 
(Export) Control Regime 
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A constellation of several 
dedicated regimes  
Trade control regimes are organised 
according to potential end-uses : 
Nuclear :  NPT, NSG and Wassenaar 
 Arrangement 
Chemical :  CWC and Australia Group 
Biological : BWC and Australia Group 
Missile : MTCR 
Conventional : Wassenaar Arrangement 
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Essential principle regulating 
International Trade of 
sensitive items 
The general trade principle is overturned 
- Principle  : Prohibition 
- Trade : Exception 
All transfers shall be submitted to 
authorisation 
- Might even lead to the prohibition of 
specific technologies : suppliers “should 
restrain themselves” from transferring some 
“sensitive technologies”  
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An ongoing process dating 
back from 1921 
1925 -1944 : Prohibition of certain means of 
war : balancing the power of parties 
involved in the conflict :  
 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in 
War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of 
Warfare 
1944 -1968 : Restraining or regulating access to 
certain technologies  
 Mac Mahon Act, NPT 
1944 -1978 : Avoiding unfair competition 
 Zangger Committee and NSG  
1
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1978 -1991 : Facing new proliferation concerns  
   Australia Group and MTCR 
1991- 2001 : From especially designed to dual-
use items 
   NSG 
2001- 2004 : Fight against terrorism as an 
 objective of export control regimes 
   NSG, MTCR, Australia Group 
Since 2004 : From export to trade control : a 
global policy 




Presently what do we have ? 
- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
Cornerstone of the regime 
- UNSC 1540 and 1887 
Calls for the establishment of an efficient national export control 
regime 
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): 
- Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part.1) 
- Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use 
Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related 
Technology (INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part.2) 
- Zangger Committee 
Guidelines for nuclear transfers (Trigger List: INFCIRC/209/
Rev.2) 
- Wassenaar Arrangement 
- Guidelines and procedures 
- List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies 
- Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and International 
Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
Export control commitments 
required by the NPT 
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Export of nuclear equipment and 
technology is essentially concerned 
by one provision  (Article III.2) : 
NPT Parties take the commitment not to 
provide:  
(a) source or special fissionable material, or 
(b) equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the processing, 
use or production of special fissionable 
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State (NNWS) for peaceful purposes, 
unless the source or special fissionable 
material shall be subject to the 
safeguards required by this Article  
1
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What does it mean ? 
Article III.2 establishes two principles 
to be implemented by the supplier 
State : 
1. To control the transfer to NNWS (as 
defined by Article IX.3) of a non-
defined list of items 
2. To submit the export of nuclear items to 
the condition that fissile materials, 
being used in the facilities where the 
items are to be  transferred, would be 
submitted to safeguards 
1
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To clarify those commitments some 
supplier States established an 
informal instrument known as NSG 
(1978) 
- Adopted a list of materials, equipments and 
technologies (INFCIRC/254/Part 1 and 2) 
- Defined that IAEA safeguards required by 
Article III of the NPT are those defined by 
the INFCIRC/153 also called 
Comprehensive Safeguards 
- Defined common Guidelines to rule their 
nuclear transfers and avoiding unfair 
competition between suppliers 
III. Principles of the EU 
(Nuclear) Export Control Regime 
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Implementation by the EU is a 
complex mechanism due to  
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Implementation by the European Union 
is a complex mechanism due to : 
 
-  Institutional framework of the 
European Union 
-  Division of competencies between 




The institutional framework 
Trade control of dual-use items is an element 
of the common commercial policy and 
therefore should be ruled by EC (TFUE) 
and Euratom Treaties 
 EU law : regulations 
 
Except for certain nuclear materials trade 
control is not governed by Euratom 




The institutional framework 
Understanding of the EU competency has 
been challenged by certain Member States 
 Presently includes in particular: lists of 
items, categories of authorisations, 
adoption and granting of General 
Authorisation, territorial validity, 
consultation mechanism, common 
market exceptions  
2
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The institutional framework 
Trade control is also an element of the EU 
external policy organised by the EU Treaty : 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP)  
 
EU WMD Strategy adopted by the 
European Council in December 2003 and the 
new lines for action for combating the 




The institutional framework 
Policy implemented by the Council   
Non-proliferation clause in 
cooperation agreement with third 
countries  
EU (EAS) participation to different 
international export control regimes 
Adoption of political principle of 




The institutional framework 
Consequently the implementation of UN 
embargoes by the EU requires two decisions: 
 
1. External relations: non-proliferation 
concerns : EU Treaty (CFSP) provisions 
Council Decision 2010/413/CFSP of 26 
July 2010 concerning restrictive measures 
against Iran (as amended) 
2. External trade: export policy TFUE 
(common commercial provisions 133/207) 
Council Regulation (EU) No 961/2010 of 
25 October 2010 concerning restrictive 
measures against Iran (as amended) 
2
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2. The division of competencies 
between EU Member States and 
EU/EC Institutions 
Trade control principles and framework of 
the Regime are established by EU/EC 
Institutions through the adoption of 
Decisions and Regulations 
  
Authorisations, exceptions, restrictions and 
sanctions : are adopted and decided 
essentially by Member States 
2
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From reactive to proactive 
 Up to 2001, the EU was essentially responsive 
to international export control regimes : 
1957 Euratom to have access to technology and 
materials 
1968 NPT ratification and attempt to exempt 
the EU from IAEA safeguards 
1978 EC statement in the different export 
control regimes to exempt its common 
market from the guidelines adopted 
within those regimes 
1994 Facing challenges of achievement of the 
common market  
2
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From reactive to proactive 
Adoption of Regulation 1334/2001: the EU and 
its Member States became proactive by 
establishing new principles to face the new 
threats of proliferation 
Several proposals tabled in different international 
trade control regimes enhancing efficiency of their 
guidelines, in particular catch-all controls 
 
Adoption of Regulation 428/2009: 
establishment of a model of trade control 
regime to meet UNSCR 1540 State 
commitments 
The specificity of nuclear trade 
in the EU 
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Submitted to a dedicated 
Treaty : Euratom 
First objective was to organise the free 
movement of certain nuclear items within 
the EC (Chapter IX):  
« g. …. by the creation of a common market 
in specialized materials and equipment, by 
the free movement of capital for investment 
in the field of nuclear energy and by 
freedom of employment for specialists within 
the Community; » 
3
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But also EU nuclear related 
export control instruments 
Legally binding instruments 
- Council Regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 
setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering 
and transit  of dual-use items (as 
amended by Regulation 1234/2011) 
- Council Regulation (EC) No 423/2007 of 19 
April 2007 concerning restrictive measures 
against Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (as amended) 
- Council Regulation (EC) No 329/2007 of 19 
April 2007 concerning restrictive measures 
against Iran (as amended) 
3
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But also EU nuclear related 
export control instruments 
Politically binding instruments 
- Council Joint Action of 22 June 2000 
(2000/0401/CFSP) concerning the control of 
technical assistance related to certain 
military end-uses 
Council Decision  2010/800/CFSP of 22 
December 2010 concerning restrictive 
measures against Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (as amended) 
- Council Common Position 2007/140/CFSP of 
27 February 2007 concerning restrictive 




The 1957 Nuclear Common 
Market  
Member States shall abolish between 
themselves, one year after the entry into 
force of this Treaty, all customs duties on 
imports and exports or charges having 
equivalent effect, and all quantitative 
restrictions on imports and exports, in 
respect of:    
 a. products in List A1 and A2   




Uranium ores containing more than 5% by weight of 
natural uranium 
Pitchblende containing more than 5% by weight of 
natural uranium 
Uranium oxide 
Inorganic compounds of natural uranium other than 
uranium oxide and uranium hexafluoride 
Organic compounds of natural uranium 
Crude or processed natural uranium 
Alloys containing plutonium 
Organic or inorganic compounds of uranium enriched 
in organic or inorganic compounds or uranium 235 
Organic or inorganic compounds or uranium 233 
Thorium enriched in uranium 233 




Deuterium and its compounds (including 
heavy water) in which the ratio of the 
number of deuterium atoms to normal 
hydrogen atoms exceeds 1 : 5 000 
Heavy paraffin in which the ratio of the 
number of deuterium atoms to normal 
hydrogen atoms exceeds 1 : 5 000 
Mixtures and solutions in which the ratio of 
the number of deuterium atoms to normal 





Equipment for the separation of uranium 
isotopes by gaseous diffusion or other 
methods 
Equipment for the production of deuterium, 
its compounds (including heavy water) 
and derivates, and mixtures or solutions 
containing deuterium in which the ratio of 
the number of deuterium atoms to normal 





Lithium ores and concentrates 
Nuclear grade metals 
Boron trifluoride 





Nuclear grade beryllium oxide 
Refractory bricks of nuclear grade beryllium 
oxide 
Other refractory products of nuclear grade 
beryllium oxide 




Magnets specially designed and constructed for 
the abovementioned machines and 
equipment (cyclotrons etc.) 
Accelerating and focusing tubes of the type 
used in mass spectrometers and mass 
spectrographs 
Intense electronic sources of positive ions 
intended for use with particle accelerators, 
mass spectrometers and similar devices 
Airtight clothing affording protection against 
radiation or radioactive contamination 






Nevertheless since 1957 
Nuclear Common market has been informally 
absorbed by the common market established 
by EEC Treaty 
 Presently essentially (if not exclusively 
only) ruled by the TFUE 
 
Free movement of nuclear items have been 
restrained indirectly by the first set of EC 
export control instruments (Regulation 





Even if certain exports of nuclear 
materials are still formally 
submitted to Chapter VI of the 
Euratom Treaty 
Article 57 
Every producer shall offer to the (Supply) 
Agency the ores, source materials or special 
fissile materials which he produces within 
the territories of Member States 
Defined by Article 192: 
1. ‘Special fissile materials’ means plutonium 
239; uranium 233; uranium enriched in 
uranium 235 or uranium 233; (…); the 
expression special fissile materials' does 





If the Agency does not exercise its right of 
option on the whole or any part of the output 
of a producer, the latter: (…) 
 
b. shall be authorized by a decision of the 
Commission to dispose of his available 
production outside the Community, (…). 
  
However, special fissile materials may be 
exported only through the Agency and in 




The Commission may not grant such 
authorization if the recipients of the 
supplies fail to satisfy it that the 
general interests of the Community 
will be safeguarded or if the terms and 
conditions of such contracts are 
contrary to the objectives of this Treaty 
4
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Concerns only the production within 
the EU 
- Uranium mined or enriched in the EU 
and plutonium produced in the EU ? 
- Transit, operation of conversion, 
reprocessing in the EU of nuclear 
material not produced in the EU are 
in principle not considered as EU 
production  
Available production ? 
4
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Non-proliferation assessment of the 
proposed export ? 
 
NPT, NSG and other EU and Member 
States international commitments to 
be considered ? 
 How Indian exports might be 
 considered ? 
General interests of the 
Community ? 
Presently EU nuclear trade 
control regime is  mostly 




Council Regulation 428/2009 of 5 May 2009 
setting up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and 
transit  of dual-use items 
Even : 
- if it is a Regulation, it is drafted more like a 
Directive  
- it is called a Community regime, it does not 
substitute national export control regimes for 
an EU Trade Control Regime. It intends 




2. Council Joint Action of 22 June 
2000 (2000/0401/CFSP) 
concerning the control of 
technical assistance related to 
certain military end-uses 
IV. Main elements of the 
Regulation 428/2008 as 
amended by 1232/2011	





- Nuclear items have been included in a 
more generic term : dual-use items 
- Dual-use items are items which can be 
used for both civil and military 
purposes 
 Not necessary limited to WMD 
1. The list of items to be 
controlled :   
4
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- But to match more accurately the definition 
of nuclear items which are not  necessary 
“military related” the following definition 
has been added : All goods that can be 
employed for both non-explosive uses and 
assisting in any way in the manufacture of 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices 
 
- Concerns equipments, materials, tangible 
and intangible technologies 
 
1. The list of items to be 
controlled :   
5
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- One list of dual-use items requiring export or 
transfer authorisation 
 Specific system of references (10 categories, 
nuclear items essentially listed in category 0) 
  
- First international compilation of  the lists of 
5 International Export Control Regimes 
Wassenaar Arrangement, MTCR, NSG, 
Australia Group and CWC. 
Some EU MS are not  members of all regimes 
(Wassenaar Arrangement: Cyprus and MTCR: 
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania)  
  
1. The list of items to be 
controlled :   
5
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- The possibility for Member States to control 
not listed 
- Two are compulsory for Member States’ 
Authorities 
1. Member States’ Authorities require, through a 
notification to exporters, an export 
authorisation for an item not listed if there is 
risk that this item might be used in weapons of 
mass destruction program 
2. Obligation for the exporter to notify to his 
National Authorities if he is aware that an 
item he intends to export … 
2. The Catch-all clause 
5
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One is optional for Member States : 
“Suspicion clause”, establishes the 
possibility for EU Member States to impose 
an export authorisation if the exporter has 
grounds for suspecting that the item … 
Has been adopted by Austria, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Spain and United 
Kingdom 
2. The Catch-all clause 
5
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Possibility for Member State to prohibit or 
impose an authorisation requirement for not 
listed dual-use items for reasons of public 
security or human rights considerations 
(Article 8) 
 Implemented by France, Germany, United 
 Kingdom 
 
3. A security exception 
5
4 
The Regulation considers two different 
operations : 
4.1. Dual-use items transferred to an end-
user established outside of the EU  
 Export, external transit and brokering 
activities 
4.2. Dual-use items transferred to an end-
user established in another MS 
 Intra-union trade  movements  
 
4. Operations to be 
controlled 
4.1. Dual-use items transferred to 
an end-user established outside of 
the EU  
5
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-  An export or a re-export as defined by the 
Community Customs Code (article 161, 182);  
- The transmission of software by intangible 
means to a destination outside the European 
Community 
- Uploading and downloading from a website 
from a third country 
- Oral transmission of technology when the 
technology is described over the telephone; 
 




One of the main question is to define who 
is the exporter ? 
 
Essential to determine the Member State 
who will have to consider the export 
application and who might issued the 
authorisation 
  
1. Exportation  
5
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Exporter is the one  
- On whose behalf an export declaration is 
made 
- Holds the contract with the consignee  
-  If no export contract the person who has 
the power for determining the sending 
of the item out of the customs territory of 
the Community; 
- Decides to transmit or make available 
software or technology by any other 





- Decided individually by Member States 
- Double conditions to submit transit to 
prohibition and/or authorisation: listed 
items (Annex I) and if it does or may 
contribute to WMD 
- Control could be extended by Member 
State to non-listed items and to listed  
dual-use items intended for military end-
use or for countries under embargoes 
 
2. External transit: a 




- Territorial validity limited 
 The authorisation/prohibition is valid 
only for the Member State who has 
decided or issued the transit 
authorisation or prohibition 
2. External transit: a 




- Brokering services : the selling, buying, 
negotiation or arrangement of 
transactions for supply of dual-use items 
from a third country to any other third 
country 
- Authorisation granted by Member States 
- Authorisations shall be valid throughout 
the Community. 
- Authorisation requirement for brokering 
services and not to exercise brokering 
activities 
  




Authorisation will be required if 
   - the broker has been informed by his 
authorities that listed items must be 
submitted to authorisation 
   - the broker is aware that the listed items… 
Possibilities for Member States to extend an 
authorisation requirement for brokering 
services 
   - to non-listed items 
   - in case the broker has grounds for 
suspecting that listed and non listed 
items… 
3. Brokering: possibility to 
control 
4.2 Dual-use items transferred to 




- Intra-union transfers 
- Concern only dual-use items considered as 
more sensitive in terms of potential 
contribution to the elaboration of weapons of 
mass destruction (Items are listed in Annex 
IV) 
 Most NSG items are covered by Annex 
IV 
- Possibilities for Member States to control 
items not listed in Annex IV 
France (cryptography), Germany 
(helicopters) and United Kingdom 
6
5 
Import : Import authorisation could 
be required unilaterally by a Member 
State  
Counterproductive  measure which 
could be easily countered by 
importing the item through another 
Member State  
 




Export authorisation granted by 
Member State 
- Principle of mutual recognition of 
authorisation granted by each Member 
State 
 Harmonisation of documents has 
been initiated: Model for Individual 
or Global Export authorisation, 
End-User Certificates 




Three types of authorisations 
Individual authorisation is granted to one specific 
exporter for one end-user covering a number 
of items (one or several); 
Global authorisation, also called open individual 
licence, is granted to one specific exporter in 
respect of a type or category of dual-use items 
which may be valid for exports to one or more 
specified countries; 
National general authorisation is valid for all 
national exporters to one or several specified 
countries covering a number of determined 
items. 




Six authorisations granted directly by the 
EU Regulation :Union General Export 
Authorisation (UGEA) 
- Export after repair; 
- Temporary export for exhibition; 
- Certain categories of items : chemicals, 
telecommunication and information 
security; 
- Certain categories of items to certain 
defined destinations; 




Should not be submitted to 
complementary MS authorisation  
 Not fully respected by MS 
Valid for a defined list of items to list of 
countries 




No common conditions 
 Establishment of common criteria to be 
considered by Member State when granting or not 
the authorisation (Article 12): 
-  Commitments and obligations taken in the relevant 
international non-proliferation regimes 
-  Obligations under sanctions imposed by the CFSP, 
OSCE or a binding resolution of UN Security 
Council 
-  Consideration of national foreign and security 
policies, including those covered by the European 
Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 
-  Consideration of intended end-use and risk of 
diversion 
 




- Before a Member State grants an authorisation 
for export or brokering services or decide on 
a transit it shall examine all valid denials 
or decisions to prohibit a transit  
- Consultation required with the one who issued 
the denial for an essentially identical 
transaction  
 Concerns all denials including catch-all 
 ones 
-Does not extend the implementation field of 
the MS catch-all clause to other MS 
- Decision of the consulted Member State is not 
legally binding 
8. Establishing exchange of 




Consultation is required when the dual-use 
items are or will be located in one or more 
Member States other than the one where 
the application has been made. 
Obligation concerns only a limited number of 
items submitted to authorisations for certain 
destinations 
Decision of the consulted Member State 
delineates the decision of the Member State 
where the application has been made 
 
Not to be mixed up with the 
consultation requirement 
established by Article 11 
V. The Council Joint Action of 22 
June 2000 (2000/0401/CFSP) 
concerning the control of technical 





- Not a Regulation : a Council Joint Action  
- Intergovernmental cooperation instrument set 
up by the Treaty on European Union (EU 
Treaty) 
 Role of the Court of Justice is limited 
- To enter into force, it has to be implemented by 
Member States into their national 
legislations 
- No formal link with the Dual-Use Regulation  





- Controlling the movement of persons 
providing services like  instruction, 
training, transmission of working 
knowledge 
- Related to the "international export 
control regimes, bodies and treaties"  has 
to be understood as the five international 
export control regimes 
 WMD and certain military items 
 (Munitions list of the WA) 
 
  




Two categories of transactions: 
1. where it is provided outside the EU and it 
is intended, or the provider is aware that it 
is intended, for use in connection with WMD 
2. Where it is related to military end-uses 
and is provided in countries of destination 
subject to an arms embargo  
 
Catch-all clause drafting 




Article 2 does not apply to the "technical 
assistance": 
(a) where it is provided in a country listed 
in Part 3 of Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 
1334/2000:  
 Australia, Canada, United States of 





(b) where it takes the form of transfer of 
information that is "in the public domain" 
or "basic scientific research" as these terms 
are respectively defined in international 





(c) where it is in oral form and not related 
to items required to be controlled by one or 
more of the international export control 
regimes, bodies and treaties. 
Not related to Annex I of the Dual-Use 
Regulation, direct reference to the lists 






Case studies on Nuclear Trade 
Or how to transform an exercice 
into a presentation   
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In March 2012, company A, which is a 
manufacturer of nuclear related equipment 
located in Romania, received an order for 2  heat 
exchangers (steam generator) from company B 
acting as a broker, located in Italy. The order has 
to be delivered to the South Korean Nuclear 
Institute, established in Seoul (D). 
 In May company A informs company B that the 
items have been manufactured and that they are 
stored in a facility owned by their branch C, 




Is such export submitted to 
authorisation(s)?  
If yes, which authority is competent for 





You are the licensing authority and you 
have informed company A in April 2011 that 
an authorisation is required.  
Quickly, company A submits an individual 
export application that contains a description 
of the technical specifications of the vacuum 
pumps. In addition, company A provides an 
end-user statement received from the South 
Korean Nuclear Institute. 
8
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According to your national law, you have to consult 
several agencies during the assessment of this 
application. Two weeks later you receive documents 
and opinions from various agencies and ministries: 
The Intelligence Services inform you that the end-
user is known for its connection to South Korean’s 
nuclear-related programmes and activities. 
The Ministry of defence inform you that the items 
cannot be used for WMD purposes and that they are 




The Ministry for Foreign and European affairs 
communicates its country profile stating: “South 
Korea has conducted in the past several activities 
related to weapons of mass destruction. South 
Korea hassigned and ratified the 
Chemical Weapons Convention, is a party to the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and maintains a 
civil nuclear program. South Korea is an active 





Furthermore, you are informed by the Department 
for European Affairs that in 1995 Denmark has 
already denied an export authorisation for the same 
end-user. The Department sends you the elements 







What would then be your decision, with regard to 






Items manufactured by A (Romania) through 
its branch C (Malta), export B (Italy) to 
South Korea (D) 
Regulation(s) 
Romania, Malta and Italy: NPT+NSG+EU 






EU 428/2009 Annex I 
“Heat exchangers”: 0A001i 
It depends on the technical specifications of 
the items 
If not in Annex I: catch-all clause (art. 4 
and 8 428/2009) could be considered and the 
exporter may be required to submit an 
application depending on political analysis  
 




EU 428/2009 Annex IV :“Heat exchangers”: 
0A001i 
It depends on the technical specifications of 
the items 
If yes an transfer authorisation shall be 
delivered (article 22) 
If not an transfer authorisation could be 
imposed by Romania considering the three 
criteria of article 22.2 
Is the item submitted to transfer 
authorisation between Romania 
and Malta ? 
9
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Regulation 428/2009 (article 2) 
C (Malta) : Art. 2 para.3. does not have the 
control. C not the exporter. 
A (Romania): Art. 2 para 3: export contract 
concluded with B and not with D . A might 
be the exporter if C acts only as broker (does 
not have the property of the item). Even if 
item not listed, art. 4 and 8 (catch-all) apply. 
 
Who is the exporter ? 
9
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B (Italy): Art.2 para 3: an export contract 
has been concluded with D (Korea) and B 
could be considered as the exporter. 
Brokering transactions is only covered if 
between two third countries   
Who is the exporter ? 
9
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- Korea has ratified NPT 
- NSG guidelines (INFCIRC/254/Part.2)  
- Safeguards: South Korea has a CSA 
agreement in force 
Conditions to be considered 




- Assurances with regard to re-transfers 
(same conditions as transfers) 
- Effective physical protection 
-End-use certificate submitted by the 
 exporter 
Conditions to be considered 




- 4 criteria: (d) might be an argument 
 against the export 
- MoD says that no risk of diversion for 
 WMD purpose 
 - No-undercut and prior denial: 
 Denmark has to be consulted ? 
Criteria for granting an 




-Item is not listed in Annex I (MoD 
says) 
- Obligation of consulting DK  only if 
transaction is essentially identical and 
Member State concerned has decided to 
submit to authorisation 
Criteria for granting an 




If  the dual-use items in respect of  which an 
application has been made for an individual export 
authorisation to a destination not listed in Annex IIa 
or to any destination in the case of  dual-use items 
listed in Annex IV are or will be located in one or 
more Member States other than the one where the 
application has been made, that fact shall be indicated 
in the application.  
Who else has to be 




The competent authorities of  the Member State to which 
the application for authorisation has been made shall 
immediately consult the competent authorities of  the 
Member State or States in question and provide the 
relevant information. The Member State or States 
consulted shall make known within 10 working days any 
objections it or they may have to the granting of  such an 
authorisation, which shall bind the Member State in which 
the application has been made.  
Who else has to be 





Malta (C) has to be consulted by Italy (B) or 
Romania (A) before issuing the 
authorisation. The Maltese decision will 
delineate the possibility to grant or not the 
export authorisation.  (art.11 para1) 
 
Therefore 
